8.1high

CVE-2017-9857

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products.

Published 9 y ago · modified 4 mo ago · JSON

CVSS
8.1
v3.0 · NVD
CISA KEV
No
not known exploited
EPSS
0.7%
percentile 53%
Public exploits
0
none known

Summary

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SMAdata2+ communication protocol does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to man in the middle, packet injection, and replay attacks. Any setting change, authentication packet, scouting packet, etc. can be replayed, injected, or used for a man in the middle session. All functionalities available in Sunny Explorer can effectively be done from anywhere within the network as long as an attacker gets the packet setup correctly. This includes the authentication process for all (including hidden) access levels and the changing of settings in accordance with the gained access rights. Furthermore, because the SMAdata2+ communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

CISA SSVC assessment

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
Assessed
2 y ago

Exploit prediction (EPSS)

0.69% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 53% of all scored CVEs.

CVSS scores

Assigned byVersionScoreVector
NVD3.08.1CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVD2.04.3AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

Affected products

  • sma sunny_tripower
  • sma sunny_boy_1.5

Classification

Weakness

References

  • sma.de /en/statement-on-cyber-security.html · x_refsource_MISC, x_transferred
  • horusscenario.com /CVE-information/ · x_refsource_MISC, x_transferred
  • sma.de /fileadmin/content/global/specials/documents/cyber-security/Whitepaper-Cyber-Security-AEN1 · x_refsource_MISC, x_transferred

Sources

vulnwire keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA; records that alias each other are merged. Machine-readable: JSON.